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INTEREST OF AMICI 
 As legislators, amici have a direct interest in this case arising from 
their constitutional responsibility to safeguard the budgetary resources of 
their respective states. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (“ACA”) fundamentally transforms the Medicaid Program and in so 
doing, effectively usurps control over the States’ budgets and legislative 
agendas, crowding out spending on other state priorities.1  Given their 
constitutionally mandated role in shaping state budgets, the amici have a 
vital stake in ensuring limitations on federal spending powers are 
maintained.2
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
   
3
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
1. Whether the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid mandates on States are 
so vague, indefinite, and subject to ad hoc modification as to violate 
                                           
1 See, e.g., Minnesota Constitution, Article 13, § 1 (“it is the duty of the 
legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools” that 
is “thorough and efficient”); North Carolina Constitution, Article IX, § 2, 
Article I, § 15 (similar). 
2 See North Carolina Constitution, Article V, § 7, Article I, § 8 (The people 
of this state shall not be taxed . . . without the consent of themselves or their 
representatives in the General Assembly, freely given."); Minnesota 
Constitution, Article XI, § 1. 
3 No party or its counsel authored this brief in whole or in part.  No one 
other than amici and their counsel contributed money to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief.   
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the Spending Clause? 
2. Whether the ACA’s individual mandate is valid under the Commerce 
Clause, despite the invalidity of the Government’s cost-shifting 
rationale? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  The Court below correctly found that the ACA is unconstitutional, 
because its individual mandate is not a valid regulation of economic activity.  
However, the ACA suffers from a second, equally fundamental constitutional 
flaw resulting from the ACA's dramatic expansion of the Medicaid Program.  
The ACA's ambiguity and indefiniteness renders it illegitimate under well- 
established Supreme Court Spending Clause jurisprudence.   The legitimacy 
of Congress's power to legislate under its spending power rests on whether 
states voluntarily and knowingly accept the conditions imposed upon them in 
return for their acceptance of federal funds.  For there to be a voluntary and 
knowing acceptance, Spending Clause legislation requires that federal 
conditions be sufficiently clear and definite so that elected representatives of 
their citizens and taxpayers can make an informed decision of whether to 
accept the funds, being cognizant of the consequences.4
                                           
4 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)  (quoting Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981)). 
  The ACA's 
ambiguity prevents states from making a clear and informed choice, requiring 
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North Carolina and Minnesota to subject themselves to unknowable and 
potentially crippling obligations in order to continue their participation in the 
Medicaid program.   
The ACA’s radical expansion of Medicaid exceeds Congressional 
authority under the Spending Clause and thus violates the Tenth Amendment. 
This is because “‘legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much 
in the nature of a contract,’ and therefore, to be bound by ‘federally imposed 
conditions,’ recipients of federal funds must accept them ‘voluntarily and 
knowingly.’’’5  “States cannot knowingly accept conditions of which they are 
‘unaware’ or which they are ‘unable to ascertain.’”6
In determining whether statutory conditions are clear enough to 
ensure a knowing and voluntary acceptance, they must be viewed “from the 
perspective of a state official who is engaged in the process of deciding 
whether the State should accept [federal] funds and the obligations that go 
with those funds.”
   
7
                                           
5 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297 
(2006)(quoting Pennhurst). 
 The ACA is too vague and indefinite to satisfy these 
requirements, providing Federal officials with a virtual blank check in 
construing and implementing many of its provisions, and extending their 
reach.  Federal officials also have vast discretion to waive key provisions of 
6 Id. at 296. 
7 Id. 
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the bill, which they have repeatedly done on a temporary, ad hoc basis.  This 
ambiguity and indefiniteness makes it impossible for states to be cognizant of 
the ACA’s future consequences, which are inherently unknowable.   
These ambiguities and unbridled discretion further make it impossible 
for states to predict what mandates or fiscal burdens states will incur under 
the ACA if they remain in the Medicaid program.  This ambiguity is 
aggravated by the fact that the federal government has used rulemaking to 
render the ACA’s apparent limits illusory (such as imposing by rule a 
controversial provision that was deleted from the ACA prior to its passage).  
The ACA’s vagueness is aggravated by its enormous complexity, massive 
scope, and unpredictable cost.   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Affordable Care Act Is Unconstitutionally Vague and 
Indefinite 
 
A. The ACA’s Ambiguity Renders It Illegitimate Under Spending 
Clause Jurisprudence, Which Requires That Federal Conditions Be 
Clear and Definite Enough to Be Contractually Valid and 
Enforceable 
 
As the Plaintiff States note, “The ACA’s dramatic expansion of the 
Medicaid Program is not a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power,” 
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since its “added burdens, costs, and liabilities” are “incalculable.” 8  This 
ambiguity and indefiniteness makes impossible any knowing and voluntary 
acceptance of its conditions by the States, violating the principle that 
“spending power conditions must be truly voluntary.”9
Indeed, as explained below, the ACA is so ambiguous and indefinite 
as to render it facially unconstitutional.  This vagueness undermines political 
accountability, aggravating the coercive effects of the ACA.
   
10 The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly characterized legislation enacted under the spending 
power as “in the nature of a contract:  in return for federal funds, the States 
agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”11
                                           
8 Opening/Response Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant States, at 47, 8.        
  “The legitimacy of 
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether 
the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”  
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  As  
9 Id. at 48. 
10 See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (Spending Clause 
legislation’s legitimacy is based on fact that “where Congress encourages 
state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain 
responsive to the local electorate's preferences” and “accountable to the 
people.”; “Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the 
local electorate.”); Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 1997) (a 
spending-clause law must speak “unambiguously, so that its design is known 
and the States may marshal their political will in opposition” to 
expropriations of sovereign rights). 
11 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 
(2002); Arlington Cent Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 296. 
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Plaintiffs-Appellees note, "a State's adoption of a federal regulation in 
exchange for federal funding must be voluntary 'not merely in theory but in 
fact.'" Dole,  483 U.S. at 211-12.  Where, as here, Congress has conditioned 
billions of dollars in Medicaid funding on the States' acceptance of the 
ACA's expansion of Medicaid, it has moved from exerting pressure to 
compulsion, eliminating any voluntary participation by the States. 
Moreover, even if one accepts the argument that States could 
plausibly choose to stop participating in the Medicaid program,12 the ACA is 
so vague that it does not – and cannot – allow the States “to exercise their 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”13
B. The ACA’s Ambiguity Leaves States Unable to Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Consent To Its Conditions, and Its Vagueness Is 
Aggravated by the Vast Discretion and Virtual Blank Check It 
Gives to Federal Officials to Implement and Waive Major 
Provisions 
   
 
“There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware 
of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”14
                                           
12 The ACA fails to speak “unambiguously” about how a State can opt out.  
See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
 Yet, as 
reported, “[M]any parts of the [ACA] are ambiguous, requiring regulatory 
clarification, while lawmakers in other cases deliberately left it to regulators 
13 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
14 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17-18; see Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 
296; Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186. 
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to provide the guidance needed for implementation.”15  The indeterminate 
and open-ended nature of the ACA is illustrated by its 700 grants of power 
to the HHS secretary to decide what is permitted and 200 instances of 
discretionary power, in which she “may” decide what is permitted.16
 A further example of the vagueness and open-endedness of the ACA 
is its requirement that States “develop service systems” to provide long-term 
care that “allocate resources for services in a manner that is responsible to 
the changing needs and choices of beneficiaries . . . .”  ACA § 2404(a).  The 
substance of this vague, subjective mandate is delegated to the discretion of 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Id.   
   
 Similarly, states must provide individuals who are “newly eligible” 
for Medicaid with “benchmark” coverage.  ACA § 2001(a)(2)(A).  Yet, the 
substance of this open-ended mandate too is expressly delegated to the 
discretion of the Secretary.  ACA §§ 2001(c)(3), 1302(a), (b).  The Secretary 
is also empowered to determine, inter alia, state enrollment programs for 
Medicaid and CHIP, ACA § 1413(a), obstetric and smoking cessation 
services that must be provided by the states, ACA §§ 2301, 4107, and 
                                           
15 Jerry Geisel, Quick action taken to implement health reform, Business 
Insurance, Dec. 13, 2010, at 14 (2010 WLNR 24886985). 
16 Robert Knight, Tyranny by Decree, Washington Times, Jan. 3, 2011, at 
B1 (discussing the ACA’s “more than 1,000 power-granting references to” 
the HHS Secretary). 
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myriad data collection, evaluation, and reporting requirements that must be 
carried out by the states, see, e.g., ACA §§ 2001(d)(1)(C), 2701, 2951.  
 Providing further uncertainty is the impact of early retirees under the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions, which could potentially add up to 
five million such retirees to state Medicaid rolls.  That financial risk was 
overlooked in the Medicaid actuary’s earlier estimate.  As he conceded in 
January, that “estimated increase in Medicaid enrollment is based on an 
assumption that Social Security benefits would continue to be included in 
the definition of income for determining Medicaid eligibility.  If a strict 
application of the modified adjusted gross income definition is instead 
applied, as may be intended by the Act, then an additional 5 million or more 
Social Security early retirees would be potentially eligible for Medicaid 
coverage.”17  More recently, he said the stricter standard was “expected” to 
apply under the ACA, causing “significantly higher” Medicaid costs for 
states.18
 The ACA’s Early Retiree Reinsurance Program is already “running 
out of money” and “will cease accepting applications,” raising the possibility 
  
                                           
17 Richard S. Foster,  The Estimated Effect of the Affordable Care Act on 
Medicare and Medicaid Outlays and Total National Health Care 
Expenditures, Testimony before the House Committee on the Budget (Jan. 
26, 2011) at 10 fn. 3. 
18 See True Cost of PPACA (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act): 
Effects on the Budget and Jobs (Mar. 30 testimony) (2011 WLNR 6323552). 
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that early retirees will wind up on Medicaid rather than in federally-
subsidized private health insurance.19
As these examples demonstrate, the ACA's requirements, and 
particularly what may be expected of the States, are unclear.  Without a clear 
understanding of the ACA's requirements, States cannot exercise their 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.  See 
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.  Because the States are not given a clear and 
informed choice, the Act is not a valid agreement to begin with, and 
voluntary, knowing acceptance is thus impossible.  See, e.g., Matter of T & 
B General Contracting, 833 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Without a 
meeting of the minds on all essential terms, no enforceable contract 
arises.”).
 
20
                                           
19 See F. Vincent Vernuccio, Under Obama, Running Out of Money Is a 
Success, Big Government, May 4, 2011 
    That invalidity makes it unnecessary to reach Florida’s equally-
valid coercion argument, since the Supreme Court’s Dole decision shows 
that courts should only decide the coercion issue after first addressing 
http://biggovernment.com/vmariano/2011/05/04/under-obama-running-out-
of-money-is-a-success/). 
20 See also Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 33; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 
(must show acceptance of “the terms of the contract’”); Brady v. U.S., 397 
U.S. 742 (1970) (plea agreement “voluntary” only if defendant “fully aware 
of the direct consequences” and plea not “induced” by “misrepresentation”).     
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whether a law satisfies the Spending Clause’s four other requirements, such 
as the requirement that it be clear and unambiguous.21
                                           
21 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09 (addressing whether a statute satisfied the 
first four requirements for spending-clause legislation, such as whether its 
conditions were “clearly stated,” before addressing the State’s coercion 
argument, even though the State did not “seriously” argue that any of those 
four requirements were violated, but instead argued coercion); id. at 214-16 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statutory provision was 
unconstitutional based on one of those four requirements, in response to an 
argument made in the amicus brief of the National Conference of State 
Legislators, even though the State itself did not make that argument); 
Kansas v. U.S., 214 F.3d 1196, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (addressing “the 
first four restrictions outlined in Dole,” even though Kansas did “not 
seriously argue” that they were violated, before addressing coercion; ruling 
on statute’s ambiguity even though “Kansas fails to assert the alleged 
invalidity”).   Contractually, the Act’s ambiguity is a threshold question that 
should be decided first before the related issue of coercion.  Riehl v. 
Cambridge Court, 226 P.3d 581, 587 (Mt. 2010)(“ambiguity” was 
“threshold” question to be decided before contractual defenses like 
unconscionability); Tri-M Group v. Sharp, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 941602 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (deciding “threshold” question that was alternative basis for 
state’s constitutional argument first, even though state had not raised it 
below); Harris v. Blockbuster, 622 F.Supp.2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (where 
contract was so indefinite as to be illusory, court  invalidated it on that 
ground, and did not reach whether it was unconscionable).  Unlike in Dole, 
the States in this case have raised each of the other Dole factors, including 
the issue of the ACA’s ambiguity.  Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 36, 42, 44-45 (11/4/2010)(Tr. Doc. 80) 
(ACA “violates the principle that conditions on federal funds must be 
unambiguous,” imposing “vast potential liabilities that cannot even be 
projected”); compare LaRocca v. Gold, 662 F.2d 144, 147-49 (2d Cir.1981) 
(ruling based on issue not briefed on appeal, where the issue had been raised 
in the trial court).  Even had they not done so, their Spending-Clause 
challenge implicates both issues. Barefoot Architect v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 
834-35 (3d Cir. 2011) (ruling on a contractual issue not raised below, 
because it was related to one that was).   
 
11 
 
Even if the ACA’s text were fully understood, many of its 
requirements would ultimately be unknowable due to the unprecedented 
discretion granted to federal officials to implement and define the content of 
key provisions, and their ability to waive key provisions of the law without 
reference to any predetermined criteria.   
Courts have long recognized that “incomprehensible” language, 
“hiding” of disadvantageous terms in obscure clauses, and other forms of 
“unfair surprise” can negate “assent to the terms of the contract,” 22 
nullifying consent.23
1. The Federal Government Has Repeatedly Waived Key Features 
of the Law, on a Temporary, Ad Hoc Basis.  
  The ACA is even worse than that, since key 
requirements of the law can be waived, extended, or redefined by HHS, as 
we explain below. 
 
 Indeed, States cannot reliably predict what the effects of the ACA will 
be on their state because even its most important features can apparently be 
waived by federal officials.  For example, the State of “Maine received a 
three-year waiver of federal rules, contained in the 2010 health-care law, that 
                                           
22 Willie v. Southwestern Bell, 549 P.2d 903, 906 (Kan. 1976). 
23 Lee v. State Farm, 57 Cal. App.3d 458, 470 (Cal. App. 1976) (Friedman, 
J., concurring) (obscurity of “fineprint sleepers” can “nullify” “consent”). 
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require insurers to spend at least 80 percent of premiums on patient care” 24 
even though this provision was a “key” inducement to passage of the Act.25   
In granting the waiver, HHS cited the “likelihood” that the requirement 
would end up “destabilizing the Maine individual health insurance market" 
if implemented.26  Similar waiver requests from three other states remain 
pending.27
The fact that key ACA provisions could destabilize a state’s health 
care system–potentially resulting in thousands of additional people losing 
their insurance and ending up on Medicaid or state exchanges–is a huge 
potential cost for a state under the ACA, one seemingly not addressed in 
ACA cost studies.  Even so, given the potential for a waiver, States cannot 
determine whether such costs are certain to occur. 
  
The Secretary’s broad discretion in implementing the ACA is further 
illustrated by the vast number of waivers she has granted of key 
                                           
24 Drew Armstrong, Maine Gets Waiver from Health Premium Rules, 
Washington Post, March 9, 2011, at A4, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/08/AR2011030805908.html.   
25 See Office of Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Key Provisions That Take Effect 
Immediately, May 3, 2010, at 2 
(http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/IMMEDIATE_PROVISIONS.pdf); 
HHS, Key Provisions That Take Effect Immediately 
(www.healthreform.gov/reports/keyprovisions.html). 
26 Id.   
27 Id. 
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requirements.28   The Obama Administration has granted almost one 
thousand waivers of ACA rules.29 Although the basis for these waivers is not 
currently known to the public, such waivers do not appear to be based on 
pre-determined criteria, but rather on political favoritism.  Indeed, a 
disproportionate number of waivers have been granted to unions like the 
SEIU, 30 Teamsters, UFCW, IBEW, and CWA.31  In fact, 733 unions and 
companies with over 2 million employees have received a waiver of just one 
ACA provision, its ban on annual coverage limits.32
Furthermore, these waivers are not permanent, lasting “only [] one 
year,” adding further uncertainty.
   
33
                                           
28 See Philip Hamburger, Are Health-Care Waivers Unconstitutional?, 
National Review, Feb. 8, 2011, 
(www.nationalreview.com/articles/259101/are-health-care-waivers-
unconstitutional-philip-hamburger). 
  Moreover, these ad hoc, temporary 
waivers were granted as a political concession to avoid people losing their 
29 Need a Waiver from Obamacare? Get In Line, Detroit News, Jan. 18, 
2011, at A13. 
30 Hamburger, Are Health-Care Waivers Unconstitutional?, supra. 
31 Michelle Malkin, Obamacare Waivers to Those Who Do Favors, 
Washington Examiner, Jan. 30, 2011, at 45 
(http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/01/obamacare-
waivers-those-who-do-favors). 
32 HHS, Helping Americans Keep the Coverage They Have and Promoting 
Transparency, available at 
www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html.  
33 HHS, Helping Americans Keep the Coverage They Have and Promoting 
Transparency, supra. 
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current coverage. 34  If these waivers are not made permanent, States may 
face substantial additional costs from people who lose their employer-
provided health insurance35 (due to factors such as increased premium 
costs36) and end up on state-subsidized Medicaid programs or state 
exchanges.  The Secretary’s vast discretion in writing and waiving ACA 
rules makes predicting these costs simply impossible, particularly 
considering that many rules that HHS was supposed to issue to implement 
the ACA’s vague requirements either have no statutory deadline,37 or have 
deadlines that were ignored.38
                                           
34 See Reed Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health Coverage, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2010, at B1 (Obama Administration “tried to defuse 
stiffening resistance” to ACA through waivers, “as part of a broader 
strategic effort” to mollify critics “at a time when the midterm elections are 
looming”; White House official admitted “concessions given to companies 
and insurers reflected attempts to avoid having people lose their current 
coverage”; “politics from state to state” cited in debate over how stringently 
to enforce ACA mandates) 
(www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/business/07insure.html)  
 
35 In the absence of waivers, some employers will likely drop their health 
care plans.  See Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver, supra (Fowler 
Packing Co. sought “waiver because their low-wage agricultural workers 
would have lost the basic coverage” they had received “for years”). 
36 Cf. Don Surber, Obamacare Leads to 47% Premium Hike, Charleston 
Daily Mail, Oct. 16, 2010, at 9:00 AM  
(http://blogs.dailymail.com/donsurber/archives/22999). 
37 See Congressional Research Service, Deadlines for the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Oct. 1, 2010, at 1 (ACA rules “generally” have “flexible deadlines or no 
deadline at all”) (available at 
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Additionally, HHS has used its rule making authority to so narrowly 
construe the grandfather provision that it will not apply to “most 
employers,”39 and the government admits that many will lose their 
eligibility.40  Since employers that lose their grandfather-clause exemption 
are then subject to “costly mandates,”41 some may terminate their insurance, 
dumping their employees onto Medicaid or state exchanges.42
By leaving such vast discretion to the Secretary to implement and/or 
waive major provisions, the ACA leaves States unable to know what is 
  
                                                                                                                             
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=54103bf6
-ae3a-47be-916e-72548ba34b5b). 
38 See id. at 3-5 (“no public information found” for many rules that were due 
to be issued by now); Sen. Tom Coburn, HHS Administrative Failure: HHS 
Failed to Meet a Third of Mandated Deadlines Under New Federal Health 
Care Law, Oct. 4, 2010, available at 
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/rightnow?ContentRecord_id=f6ef
e11e-39bc-4532-a586-d1ad0b608e80. 
39 George Pantos, Manage Rising Health Care Costs, Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, Sept. 20, 2010, at A21 (“rules governing ‘grandfathered’ 
insurance plans” released last year by HHS” are “so onerous, though, that 
most employers will find it impossible to follow them.”)  
40 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan, 75 FR 34538, 
34552 (June 17, 2010) (employer relinquishing grandfather status estimated 
at between 33% to 69% for all employers, with large employers ranging 
from 29% to 64%).  
41 Manage Rising Health Care Costs, supra. 
42 See Greg Johnson, Employers Likely to Drop Health Insurance Under 
Health Care Law, Knoxville News Sentinel, Sept. 3, 2010 (Actuary for 
Medicaid and Medicare estimates that “14 million workers and their 
families” will end up “losing employer coverage” due to the ACA) 
(www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/sep/03/employers-likely-to-drop-
insurance-under-health/). 
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expected of them, making knowing acceptance of its terms impossible.  
Indeed, the amount of discretion granted to the Secretary further reveals the 
illusory nature of the ACA. 
2. By Leaving the Federal Government With Unbridled Power to 
Expand States’ Medicaid Obligations, the ACA Violates 
Principles Forbidding Illusory and Indeterminate Contracts 
 
The illusory nature of the ACA is evidenced by the unbridled 
authority granted to the Secretary by the ACA.  Indeed, backers of the Act 
have called the ACA a mere “starter home” to be expanded and fleshed out 
in the future,43 one that will make Medicare seem like a “model of 
simplicity” by comparison.44 Thus, it will “end up covering much more 
than” people think.45   Indeed, the ACA has been described as a “skeleton” 
to be “fleshed out” through administrative fiat.46
                                           
43 Sen. Tom Harkin, Health Legislation A Solid Foundation to Build Upon, 
Wilmington News-Journal, Dec. 30, 2009, at A18 (ACA’s passage is just 
“the opening act,” leaving “plenty of room for additions”). 
  For example, the ACA left 
the HHS with such unbridled authority that it wrote rules implementing 
44 Jacob Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at 
A25 (“Sen. Tom Harkin put the point well when he described the health bill 
as a ‘starter home.’  What Harkin neglected to mention is that the home isn't 
built yet”).  
45 Nick Gillespie, Obamacare and Mission Creep Redux: Sen. Harkin Says 
Obamacare “is a Starter Home”, Reason, Dec. 21, 2009. 
(http://reason.com/blog/2009/12/21/obamacare-mission-creep-redux). 
46 See Insurance Barn, 2 Options If You Lose Your Group’s Grandfathering 
By Changing Contribution Levels, Feb. 11, 2011 (PPACA’s “skeleton” has 
been “fleshed out” with rules that “nullified” its grandfather clause 
exemption for many employers). 
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provisions (such as end-of-life planning) that had earlier been removed from 
the Act in response to public outcry.47
But the federal government does not have unbridled authority under 
the Spending Clause to make any amendments to Medicaid, no matter how 
coercive or arbitrary, or how far they go toward fundamentally changing the 
contractual bargain between the federal government and the States.  See, 
e.g., 1 Williston on Contracts § 4:21 (4th ed. 2010) (“reservation in either 
party of a future unbridled right to determine the nature of the performance” 
renders contract “too indefinite for enforcement”).  Such unbridled power 
vested in one party makes a contract illusory and non-enforceable under 
Pennhurst and its progeny.  See also Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 2 
cmts. a & e.   
   
C. The ACA’s Costs Are Extremely Unpredictable, Further 
Preventing States from Being Able to Voluntarily and Knowingly 
Consent 
 
                                           
47 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Obama Returns to End-of-Life Plan That Caused 
Stir, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 2010, at A1 (“When a proposal to encourage end-
of-life planning touched off a political storm over ‘death panels,’ Democrats 
dropped it from legislation to overhaul the health care system. But the 
Obama administration will achieve the same goal by regulation, starting Jan. 
1. . . .the government will pay doctors who advise patients on options for 
end-of-life care, which may include advance directives to forgo aggressive 
life-sustaining treatment.”) 
(www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/politics/26death.html).  
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As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Given the complexity 
of the health care system prior to PPACA, and the many changes generated 
by the new law, the impact on states will vary and will be difficult to 
estimate, even with the best modeling.”48
“State impacts will vary based on current coverage levels across 
states, generosity of the state’s Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules and 
other state-financed coverage programs, existing private insurance 
regulatory authority, standards, and resources, current state fiscal 
health, and other factors. Such variation creates difficulties in 
accurately estimating costs across states. There are substantial 
differences among states in terms of the percentages of the states’ 
populations that would meet the definition of “newly eligible” under 
the mandatory Medicaid expansion as compared to previously eligible 
individuals. Federal matching rates to share in the cost of 
Medicaid/CHIP coverage for these individuals under health reform 
will vary by state, by year, and by eligibility status.”
  Moreover, the ACA’s Medicaid 
costs will vary widely among States: 
49
Moreover, “Beyond the extra Medicaid costs that states are certain to incur, 
there are some other state Medicaid cost increases that are probable, but not 
definite,” such as “payments to so-called Disproportionate Share Hospitals 
(DSH) and payments to specialist physicians.”
 
50
                                           
48 CRS, Memorandum re: Variation in Analyses of PPACA’s Fiscal Impact 
on States, Sept. 8, 2010, at 1 (Tr. Doc. 80, Ex. 36). 
  
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Edmund Haislmaier & Brian Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, 
Heritage Foundation, July 1, 2010, available at 
www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Obamacare-Impact-on-States. 
19 
 
The ACA has already proven much more expensive than was 
predicted just a short time ago.  Soon after its passage, the CBO increased its 
estimate of the ACA’s costs to the federal government alone by $115 
billion.51   Its cost to state governments also grew.  For example, the ACA 
provided $5 billion for states to run high-risk pools.  But this number turned 
out to be grossly insufficient to cover state costs.  “In June, Richard Foster, 
Medicare’s chief actuary, told The New York Times that the $5 billion will 
run dry as early as 2011,” and “there is enough funding to cover only about 
200,000 of those people, or less than 3 percent. . . .ObamaCare leaves states 
on the hook for the rest of the tab.”52
These uncertainties in the ACA’s costs matter enormously because of 
the massive scope of its expansion of state Medicaid obligations
   
53  and the 
ACA’s vast delegation of policymaking to federal officials.54
                                           
51Another Empty Pledge, Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 17, 2010, at 6B.  
  “Obamacare’s 
unfunded mandates are a fiscal time bomb set to explode state balance sheets 
52 Peter Suderman, Rogue States, Reason Magazine, Oct. 2010 
(http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/14/rogue-states). 
53 See Opening/Response Brief at 53 (Medicaid is already 26% of Florida’s 
budget).     
54 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (“vagueness” relevant to 
“overbreadth inquiry”); Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ga. 2004) 
(“broad language” made law’s imprecise contours “too vague” to be 
constitutional, even though those words had a “dictionary definition,” 
especially since their broad reach had the effect of delegating “basic policy 
matters” to officials on “an ad hoc” basis). 
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across the country starting in 2014,” notes the Heritage Foundation.55 The 
ACA will force States to “massively expand their already burdensome 
Medicaid rolls” to include “all non-elderly individuals with family incomes 
below 138 percent of the federal poverty line.”56 “But that is just the benefit 
costs.  Obamacare does not pay for any of the costs necessary to administer 
the expansion of the Medicaid rolls, rolls that are expected to increase by 
approximately 50 percent in states like Nevada, Oregon, and Texas”; indeed, 
“just the administrative costs of the Obamacare Medicaid expansion will 
cost almost $12 billion by 2020.” 57
While the ACA’s precise costs are unknown, preliminary estimates 
are staggering.  In Texas alone, “the Medicaid expansion may add more than 
2 million people to the program and cost the state up to $27 billion in a 
decade,” while Florida faces “an additional $5.2 billion in spending between 
2013 and 2019 and more than $1 billion a year beginning in 2017,” and 
California faces billions in “annual costs”; “The seven-year cost of the 
    
                                           
55 Heritage Foundation, Morning Bell: The Obamacare Burden To Your 
State Budget, November 12th, 2010 at 9:22am 
(http://blog.heritage.org/2010/11/12/morning-bell-the-obamacare-burden-to-
your-state-budget/). 
56 Id. 
57 Id., citing Haislmaier & Blase, supra note 21; accord Peter Suderman, 
Rogue States, Reason Magazine, Oct. 2010 (“ObamaCare also fails to cover 
the administrative costs associated with” the expansion) 
(http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/14/rogue-states). 
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Medicaid expansion in Indiana is estimated to be between $2.59 billion and 
$3.11 billion, with 388,000 to 522,000 people joining the state’s Medicaid 
rolls,” while “Obamacare will result in nearly one of five Nebraskans being 
covered by Medicaid.58
The ACA leaves states obligated to cover up to 12 million additional 
people already eligible for Medicaid who did not previously enroll, some of 
whom will likely enroll as a result of the ACA penalty for not having health 
insurance.
   
59  Many studies of its cost, such as a Kaiser study cited by ACA 
supporters, failed to take this cost into account, looking at the costs of 
newly-eligible people, not people who were already eligible but did not sign 
up prior to the ACA.60
                                           
58 Lanhee Chen, How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets, 
Heritage Foundation, Nov. 10, 2010 (Backgrounder #2489)  (available at 
   Its individual mandate requires many of these 
http://ww.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/How-Obamacare-
Burdens-Already-Strained-State-Budgets) (citing estimates by the Florida 
Agency for Health Care Administration and the California Legislative 
Analyst’s Office, and a study by the Milliman economists hired by Nebraska 
and Indiana). 
59 Brian Blase, Obamacare and Medicaid: Expanding a Broken Entitlement 
and Busting State Budgets, Heritage Foundation, Jan. 19, 2011  
(www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/01/obamacare-and-medicaid-
expanding-a broken -broken-entitlement-and-busting-state-budgets) (citing a 
study by the National Institute for Health Care Management). 
60 Michael Cannon, New Cato Study: ObamaCare’s Medicaid Mandate 
Imposes Staggering Costs on States, Cato Institute, Jan. 19, 2011 (“the 
Kaiser Family Foundation’s projections are lower because” they did not take 
into account “people who were eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled under 
the pre-ObamaCare rules,” despite studies showing that the ACA “will 
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people to obtain individual health insurance – which effectively forces them 
into Medicaid, since the ACA denies people below the poverty line any 
subsidy for their insurance premiums, even while subsidizing the insurance 
of people with incomes up to four times the poverty level.61   “ObamaCare 
provides states with zero additional federal financial support for new 
enrollees among those eligible for Medicaid under the old laws.  .  . 
estimates of  those costs range from just $11.7 billion for California to a high 
of $65.5 billion in New York.”62
Calculating those costs is subject to great uncertainty, however, 
because people don’t sign up for Medicaid for a variety of reasons that affect 
their healthcare costs, such as good health, ignorance, or the availability of 
other insurance (such as employer-provided health insurance that they will 
eventually lose due to the ACA, resulting in their ending up on Medicaid
    
63
                                                                                                                             
encourage people to enroll in Medicaid”) (www.cato-at-liberty.org/new-
cato-study-obamacares-medicaid-mandate-imposes-staggering-costs-on-
states/). 
).    
61 See ACA § 1402(b); Opening/Response Brief at 67-68. 
62 Jagadeesh Gokhale, Estimating ObamaCare's Effect on State Medicaid 
Expenditure Growth, at 1-2 (Cato Institute 2010) 
(www.cato.org/pubs/researchnotes/WorkingPaper-4.pdf). 
63 See Reed Abelson, Insurer Cuts Health Plans as New Law Takes Hold, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2010, at B1 (insurer that “provides coverage to about 
840,000 people” through employers stopped providing health insurance in 
response to the ACA); cf. Emily Ramshaw, Child-Only Insurance Vanishes, 
a Health Act Victim, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2011, at A23. 
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Under traditional Medicaid, states’ plans differed widely, as long as a 
state met minimum requirements.  But the ACA prohibits states from 
tightening their eligibility rules, even though that is a “typical way” to 
control rising costs in a recession,64 when revenue falls and Medicaid 
“enrollment surges.”65
The indefinite nature of the States’ long-run financial commitments to 
Medicaid makes the ACA on its face contractually infirm and hence 
unconstitutional.     
  In other words, the ACA locks the states in to 
choices they had been led to believe could be changed at will, punishes 
states for their past generosity, and renders their future expenses more 
unpredictable.   
D. The ACA's Complexity Accentuates its Vagueness 
 
The ACA’s sheer complexity is aptly, but only partially, captured by 
the chart provided by minority staff of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), 
which is found at the end of this brief in the Addendum that follows the 
Certificate of Service.  (It also is found in the trial record,66
                                           
64 See Rogue States, supra, note 62 . 
 and on the 
65 See Christine Vestal, Medicaid: How It Works, What’s Being Proposed, 
Newark Star-Ledger, Apr. 24, 2011, at 8. 
66 Doc. 132, p. 5 (amicus brief of Gov. Pawlenty, 11/19/2010). 
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Internet.67)  While that “chart displays a bewildering array of new 
government agencies, regulations and mandates,” the reality is even more 
complicated, since “committee analysts could not fit the entire health care 
bill on one chart. ‘This portrays only about one-third of the complexity of 
the final bill. It’s actually worse than this.’”68
This enormous complexity accentuates its vagueness,
 
69
                                           
67 Joint Economic Committee, Republican Staff, Your New Health Care 
System,  
 and makes it 
all but impossible to comprehend “from the perspective of a state official 
who is engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should accept 
[federal] funds and the obligations that go with those funds.”  Arlington 
http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=5ee16e0f-
6ee6-4643-980e-b4d5f1d7759a; see Bryant v. Avado Brands, 187 F.3d 1271, 
1280-81 (11th Cir. 1999) (judicially noticing SEC web site content); 
Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing JEC staff 
report).   
68 See JEC Republicans, America’s New Health Care System Revealed: 
Updated Chart Shows Obamacare's Bewildering Complexity, Committee 
News, Aug. 2, 2010 (quoting Rep. Brady), available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeNews&Con
tentRecord_id=bb302d88-3d0d-4424-8e33-3c5d2578c2b0.  
69 Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991)(“complexity” of statutes can 
make “it difficult” for citizens “to know and comprehend” them); O’Brien v. 
Star Gas Propane, 2006 WL 2008716, *12 (N.J. App. 2006) (“technical and 
cumbersome” terms made release too “difficult to understand”); Lovey v. 
Regence Blue Shield, 72 P.3d 877, 883 n.2 (Id. 2003) (“complex legalistic 
language” can result in “unfair surprise” and procedural unconscionability); 
Jerry Rossman Corp. v. C.I.R., 175 F.2d 711, 713-14 (2nd Cir. 1949) (price 
control rules were so complex that  “innocent violations” could occur despite 
“due care,” making penalties tax-deductible).  
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Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 291.  The magnitude of the complexities make 
it virtually impossible for state officials to “exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
E. The ACA’s Ambiguity and Violation of States’ Reasonable 
Expectations Make Its Pressure More Impermissibly Coercive 
 
Although Congress can pressure states to adopt federal policies 
through the carrot of Spending Clause legislation to a certain extent, it 
cannot “coerce” them into doing so.  The Supreme Court “‘has recognized 
that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”70  “The more massive the amount of federal funding that 
Congress threatens to withhold, the greater the need for Congress to 
demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the conditions and the 
funds.”71
Moreover, “fraud and physical duress are not the only grounds upon 
which courts” find contracts impermissibly coercive.
  Such a reasonable relationship is hard to show when the statute 
itself is vague, like the ACA. 
72  Courts often refuse 
to enforce “vague or obscure contractual language”73
                                           
70 Opening/Response Brief at 49, quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12. 
 in contracts of 
71 Opening/Response Brief at 51-52. 
72 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 85-86 (N.J. 1960). 
73 Conseco Finance v. Wilder, 42 S.W.3d 331, 342 n.20 (Ky. App. 2001). 
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adhesion, “prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the 
acceptance of the other” on a “take it or leave it basis.”74  That accurately 
describes the ACA.   (Indeed, the ACA is worse than an adhesion contract, 
since it not only spans 2700 pages of complicated requirements, but also 
gives federal officials enormous power to expand the statute’s reach through 
rulemaking, fundamentally rewriting the “contract”).  Consent is deemed 
absent75 where the provision violates a party’s “reasonable expectations.”76 
The ACA violates the States’ reasonable expectations, both by imposing 
indeterminate new obligations, and by locking them into previously-made 
coverage decisions that they had been led to believe were voluntary and 
alterable at will.77  It also exploits their loss of bargaining power,78
                                           
74 Stevens v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 377 P.2d 284, 297 (Cal. 1962). 
 
75 Leonard & Butler v. Harris, 653 A.2d 1193, 1199 (N.J. App. 1995) (no 
legally cognizable “consent”); Blair v. Pitchess, 486 P.2d 1242, 1254-55 
(Cal. 1971) (“consent” to adhesion contract was “ineffective” for 
constitutional purposes). 
76 See Riehl, 226 P.3d at 584 (“contract of adhesion will not be enforced” if  
terms “are not within the reasonable expectations of the party”); Gray v. 
Zurich Insurance, 419 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1966).  Even outside the context 
of adhesion contracts, changes to existing contracts that violate reasonable 
expectations can breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Restatement (2nd) of Contracts, § 205 & cmts. (a) & (d).  This is especially 
true in ongoing relational contracts, see Carmen D. Caruso, Franchising’s 
Enlightened Compromise: The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, 26-SPG Franchise L.J. 207, 209 (2007), a category that 
encompasses state-federal cooperative programs like Medicaid.   
77 Opening/Response Brief  at 8-9 (discussing how the ACA forbids states to 
tighten their existing Medicaid eligibility and coverage limits). 
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predicating coverage of their poorest citizens on states’ inability to withdraw 
from Medicaid.79    (The fact that the ACA makes fundamental changes to  
existing Medicaid programs that states have come to depend on makes it 
subject to tougher scrutiny than various programs previously upheld by the 
courts, which involved new programs that states were freer to reject.80
II. 
) 
 
The ACA’s Individual Mandate Cannot Be Justified Under a Cost-
Shifting Rationale, and Exceeds Congress’s Power Under the 
Commerce Clause 
 
The ACA’s mandates will increase–not reduce–cost-shifting.  
“According to the Congressional Budget Office, around half of the people 
                                                                                                                             
78 States’ healthcare systems are now “driven largely” by programs like 
Medicaid, see Mark E. Douglas, Finally Moving Beyond the Fiction: An 
Overview of the Recent State Rally for Health Care Reform, 5 Ind. Health L. 
Rev. 277, 332 (2008), and have evolved to rely and depend on it.  See also 
Opening/Response Brief  at 6 (discussing states’ growing dependence on 
Medicaid).  Thus, states have little choice but to remain in Medicaid, even if 
the ACA’s changes to Medicaid violate their reasonable expectations, 
leaving them with unequal bargaining power vis-à-vis the federal 
government.  This is significant, because contractual modifications are 
subject to greater scrutiny when bargaining power has “shifted away” from a 
party.  See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian 
Difficulty, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 781, 819 fn. 90 (2001)(discussing duress), 
citing, e.g., Alaska Packers v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902). 
79 Opening/Response Brief  at 52.   
80 New conditions that violate a party’s reasonable expectations can be 
invalidly coercive even in the context of an at-will contract.  Reiver v. 
Murdoch & Walsh, 625 F.Supp. 998, 1013 (D. Del. 1985) (“cases have 
recognized the validity of claims or defenses based on economic duress 
involving the threatened termination of at-will employees”).    
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who are expected to become newly insured under the new law will be 
enrolled in Medicaid. But Medicaid payments to doctors and hospitals are so 
low that the program creates a cost shift of its own. In fact, a long line of 
academic research shows that low rates of Medicaid reimbursement translate 
into higher prices for the privately insured.”81
So it is deeply ironic that the Government justifies the ACA’s 
individual mandate by claiming that uninsured people “shift significant costs 
to other participants” in the healthcare system.
 
82  But researchers have found 
that “there is no credible evidence of a cost shift of any substantial 
consequence, either within state boundaries or across state lines.”83  
Similarly, a 2007 study co-authored by MIT’s Jonathan Gruber – who 
advised the ACA’s sponsors84 – “found no evidence that doctors charged 
insured patients higher fees to cover the cost of caring for the uninsured.”85
                                           
81 John F. Cogan, et al., Obamacare and the Truth About ‘Cost-Shifting’, 
Wall Street Journal, Mar. 11, 2011, at A15. 
   
Indeed, Gruber found that doctors earn “‘more on uninsured patients than on 
insured patients with comparable treatments,’” while another study found 
82 Brief for Appellants at 10. 
83 Cogan, Obamacare and the Truth About ‘Cost-Shifting’, supra.  
84 Ed Morrissey, Did HHS Help Hide Gruber’s Status As Paid Shill?, Daily 
Caller, Jan. 29, 2010 (http://dailycaller.com/2010/01/29/did-hhs-help-hide-
gruber%E2%80%99s-status-as-paid-shill/). 
85 Obamacare and the Truth About ‘Cost-Shifting’, supra. 
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that “‘uninsured patients as a group still paid a higher percentage of charges, 
on average, than Medicare and Medicaid.’” 86
 More importantly, “the economics of markets for health services 
suggests that any cost shifting that may occur is unlikely to affect interstate 
commerce. Because markets for doctor and hospital services are local--not 
national--the impact of cost shifting will be borne where it occurs, not across 
state lines.”
  
87  Even Gibbons v. Ogden, which “described the Federal 
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded,”88 recognized that 
“health laws of every description” were beyond the reach of the Commerce 
Clause. 89
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s invalidation of the ACA 
should be upheld. 
Dated: May 10, 2011  
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
/s/ Hans F. Bader___________ 
                                           
86 Michael Cannon, Are the Uninsured Free-Riding, Cato Institute, Aug. 6, 
2008 (www.cato-at-liberty.org/are-the-uninsured-free-riding/) (quoting and 
linking to studies).  
87 Cogan, Obamacare and the Truth About ‘Cost-Shifting’, supra. 
88 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). 
89 Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824). 
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3311, 9001, 9010, 10101, 10104, 10901, 
10905; HCERA §§1401, 1406
Employers
Mandates, Regulations, 
& Taxes
§§1511, 1512, 1513, 9001, 9002, 
10106, 10901; HCERA §§1003, 1401
Demonstra-
tion Program
§3001
Public Data 
Disclosure 
System
§3006, 
10301
FFS 
Accountable 
Care 
Organizations 
Program
§§3022, 10307
Community-
Based Care 
Transitions 
Program
§3026
Hospital 
Quality 
Reporting 
Program
§3004, 3005
Medicaid 
Health Home 
Program
§2703
Federal 
Coordinated 
Health Care 
Office
§2602
Medicaid 
Quality 
Measurement 
Program
§2701
State-
Specific Adult 
Health Quality 
Measures
§2701
Medicaid 
Expansion: 
+16 million
§§2001-2004
CBO Cost Estimate,
3/20/10
State 
Medicaid 
Agencies
§§2602, 2701, 2703, 
3011
Medicare
Cuts: $528.9bn
(includes MA cuts)
Title III; 
CBO Cost Estimate,
 3/20/10
Medicare 
Advantage 
Cuts: $205.9bn
§§3201, 10318; HCERA 
§1102; CBO Cost 
Estimate, 
3/20/10
Subsidy: 
Medicare Part D 
Drug Program 
“Donut Hole”
§3301; HCERA 
§1101
Hospital 
Compare 
Website
§3001
Hospital
Value-Based 
Purchasing 
Program
§§3001, 10335
Center
for Medicare
& Medicaid 
Innovation
§§3021, 10305, 
10306
Physician 
Value-Based 
Payment 
Modifier
§§3007
Annual Fee
§9008; HCERA 
§1404
Hospitals
§§1311, 3001, 10335
Skilled Nursing 
Facilities
§§3006, 10310
§§3006, 10301
Ambulatory 
Surgical Centers
§§3006, 10301
Home 
Health Agencies
§3006
Medical Device 
Manufacturers
§§9009, 10904; 
HCERA §1405
Pharmaceutical 
Companies
§9008; HCERA §1404
Inpatient 
Rehabilitation 
Facilities
§3004
Hospice 
Programs
§3004
PPS-Exempt 
Cancer Hospitals
§3005
Medicare 
Administrative 
Contractors
§3311
Health Industry
Mandates, Regulations, 
Taxes, & Payment Cuts
§§1311, 3001-3006, 3311, 9008, 9009, 
10327, 10331, 10335, 10904; HCERA 
§§1404, 1405
Long-Term
Care Hospitals
§3004
Medical 
Device
Excise Tax
§§9009, 10904; 
HCERA 
§1405
IPAB
§3403, 10320
IPAB 
Consumer 
Advisory 
Council
§§3403, 10320
Medicare 
Part A Trust 
Fund
§3026, 3403, 
6301,9015
Medicare 
Part B Trust 
Fund
§3026, 6301
Public
Health Quality & 
Efficiency Measures 
Development
Program
§§3013, 10304
Hours of Service 
Determination 
for Calculating 
Employer Mandate 
Penalty
§§1513, 10106
Rules for 
Insurance 
Claims Appeals
§1001, 10101
Health 
IT Policy 
Committee
§1561
Office of 
Personnel 
Management
§§1334, 10104
President
§§ 3012, 3024, 3403, 4001,
 8002, 10320
Cures 
Acceleration 
Network 
Review Board
§10409
National 
Diabetes 
Report Card 
Program
§10407
CLASS 
Independence 
Benefit Plan
§8002
CDC
§§1001, 4003, 4004, 
4102, 10407
NIH
§§4305, 6301, 
10409
National 
Partnership on 
Prevention & 
Health 
Promotion
§4004
National 
Public Education 
Campaign on 
Prevention & Health 
Promotion
§4004
Community 
Preventive 
Services Task 
Force
§4003
National Oral 
Health Public 
Education 
Campaign
§4102
Cures 
Acceleration 
Network
§10409
CLASS 
Independence 
Fund Board of 
Trustees
§8002
Life 
Independence 
Accounts
§8002
National 
Diabetes Mortality 
Statistics Education 
Training Program
§10407
Eligibility 
Assessment 
System
§8002
Personal
Care Attendants 
Workforce 
Advisory Panel
§8002
CLASS 
Independence 
Fund
§8002
CLASS 
Independence 
Advisory 
Council
§8002
Black Lung 
Benefits Act
§1556
Office of
 Multi-State
 Qualified 
Health Plans
§1334, 10104
Public
Health 
Service
§§3011, 4002, 4302
Surgeon 
General
§4001
Advisory
Group on 
Prevention, Health 
Promotion, and 
Integrative and 
Public Health
§4001
PCORI 
Expert 
Advisory 
Panels
§6301
PCORI 
Methodology 
Committee
§6301
PCORI Board 
of Governors
§6301
PCORI
Website
§6301
State 
Protection & 
Advocacy 
Systems
§8002
Justice
 Department
§6703
National 
Prevention, 
Health Promotion, 
& Public Health 
Council
§4001
Prevention 
Website
§4004
Website
“Transparency 
in Government”
§1552
Prevention
& Public 
Health Fund
§4002
Interagency 
Working Group 
on Health Care 
Quality
§3012
PCORI
Trust Fund
§6301
PCORI
§§6301, 10602
Social
Security 
Administration
§1411
Homeland 
Security 
Department
§1411
Labor 
Department
§§1001, 1302, 1311, 1511, 1512, 
1513, 6605, 10101, 10106
CLASS 
Program
§8002
Office
of Tax 
Analysis
§§1331, 10104
Elder 
Justice 
Coordinating 
Council
§6703
Advisory
Board on Elder 
Abuse, Neglect, 
& Exploitation
§6703
Multi-
Disciplinary 
Panels on 
Improving Long-
Term Care
§6703
Elder Abuse, 
Neglect, & 
Exploitation 
Forensic Centers
§6703
IRS
§§1401, 1402, 1411, 1412 1414,
1421, 1501, 9004, 9005,
10105, 10901; HCERA 
§§1401, 1402
Treasury 
Department
§§1311, 1331, 4002, 
8002, 10104
National 
Health Disparities 
Data Collection & 
Reporting
 System
§4302
Health
Care Quality 
Website
§§3011, 3012
Interagency 
Pain Research 
Coordinating 
Committee
§4305
National
Health Strategy 
& Priorities
Office
§3011
Medicaid/
CHIP
Title II; §§1413, 3011
Medicare
Title III, §2602
CMS
§§3013, 3021, 3026, 
3403, 10305, 10306,
10320
Medicare 
Prescription Drug 
and MA-PD 
Complaint System
§3311
CMS 
Actuary
§§1331, 3403, 10104
Your New Health Care System
Congress
§§1312, 1411, 3311, 5605, 8002
Non-
Hospital
Value-Based 
Purchasing 
Program
§§3006, 10301
§3004
§§3002, 10327, 10331
§§3002, 10327, 10331
§3007
§§3007
Physician 
Quality 
Reporting 
System
§§3002, 10327, 
10331
Physicians
§§1311, 3002, 3003, 10327, 10331
